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MIRANDA AND THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN ENGLAND
ChrisBlair'
I.

INTRODUCTION

For those who ply their trade, whether it be business or crime, in
the burgeoning global economy, an understanding of and familiarity
with the laws of other countries and how they compare to those in the
United States is quite useful, if not essential. An experienced
criminal suspect from the United States who finds himself facing
interrogation by English police might be comforted to hear the police
caution him about his right to remain silent in language that is
reminiscent of the Mirandawarnings in the United States. However,
unless he pays close attention to everything the English police tell
him, he may miss the fact that in England, unlike in the United
States, the exercise of the right to silence might ultimately lead a jury
to draw adverse inferences about the suspect's guilt.
To set the stage and highlight the difference between what
interrogation suspects are told in the United States and England, this
article will first outline the precise wording of the Miranda warning
given to American suspects and the "caution" given to English
suspects. Part II will discuss the history and current status of the
right to silence in the U.S. (Part III) and Britain (Part IV), with
particular emphasis on the propriety of drawing adverse inferences
from the actual exercise of that right.
II. RIGHT TO SILENCE WARNING OR CAUTION
In Miranda v. Arizona,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that any criminal suspect who is subjected to custodial interrogation

' Associate Professor, University of Tulsa, College of Law; LL.M., Columbia
University, 1982; J.D., Ohio State University, 1976.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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must be informed of certain rights as the first step in protecting the
suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2
Although the Court has not been explicit in defining when a suspect is
in "custody," it is probably best considered the equivalent of a "formal
arrest."3 The Court has held that "the term 'interrogation' under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect."4 Thus, "if a person in custody is to be subjected to
interrogation, he must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has the right to remain silent."5 In addition, that warning
"must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and
will be used against the individual in court." While Miranda also
requires that such a suspect be informed of various aspects of the
right to counsel,7 those provisions of the Miranda warnings are
beyond the scope of this article.
Since England does not have a written constitution,8 any
requirement that the police warn a suspect about a right to silence
must be based upon common law or legislation passed by Parliament.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE) provides that
the Secretary of State (also known as the Home Secretary) "shall issue
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (The 5"' Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides in pertinent part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself")
3. In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the court held that "the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop" does not amount
to "custodial interrogation." In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated that the
"usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' than to a formal
arrest," suggesting that "custody" under Miranda is analogous to formal arrest. Id. at

439. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) for an explanation of a "Terry stop."
4. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.

6. Id. at 469.
7. Id. at 442. Miranda provides that "an individual held for interrogation must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation." Id. at 471. It also provides "that if he is indigent a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him." Id. at 473.
8. Daniel J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY 91 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999). See David Jenkins, Both Ends Against the
Middle: European Integration,Devolution, and the Sites of Sovereignty in the United
Kingdom, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (2002) and A. V. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1965) (discussing the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty).
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codes of practice in connection with ... the detention, treatment,

questioning and identification of persons by police officers."9 Pursuant
to that authority, the Secretary has promulgated Code of Practice C
which requires that a "person whom there are grounds to suspect of
an offence must be cautioned before any questions about it ...are put
to him . . .. "0 The "caution" must be as follows: 'You do not have to
say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention
when questioned something which you later rely on in court.
Anything you do say may be given in evidence."" The portion of the
caution about "harming your defence" was necessitated by the passage
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994,12 which will

later be discussed in detail. The suspect also has a right to have
access to legal advice," although, again, this aspect of the questioning
process is beyond the scope of this article.
The actual warnings, or caution, about the right to remain silent
are fairly similar in the United States and England. The striking
difference between them is that in England, the suspect must also be
cautioned about the consequences that might occur due to remaining
silent. Although both countries had historically disallowed the
drawing of adverse inferences from the exercise of the right to remain
silent, England reversed itself on that point with the adoption of the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act in 1994.
III. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND ADVERSE INFERENCES - UNITED

STATES
As early as 1893 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Wilson v. United
States,"4 held that it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on
the failure of the defendant in a criminal action to appear as a witness
9. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 66 (Eng.).
10. Id at App. A, § 10.1, Code of Practice C (Eng.). There are five Codes of Practice
promulgated under PACE: Code A: the exercise by police officers of statutory powers
of stop and search; Code B: the searching of premises by police officers and the
seizure of property found by police officers on persons or premises; Code C: the
detention, treatment and questioning of persons by police officers; Code D: the
identification of persons by police officers; and Code E: the tape recording of
interviews by police officers at police stations with suspected persons. CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 8, at 92.
11. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, App. A, § 10.4, Code of Practice C

(Eng.).
12. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 34 (Eng.).
13. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, §§ 56, 58 (Eng.).

14. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 11.1

on his own behalf. Although Wilson was based on a federal statute,
the rationale of the decision provided the basis for the holding in
Griffin v. California,"in which the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions
by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."16 The Griffin
opinion quoted with approval from Wilson:
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand,
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive
timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against
him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to
increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every
one, however honest,
who would therefore willingly be placed on
17
the witness stand.

The Griffin court further held that "comment on the refusal to
testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice'
which the Fifth Amendment outlaws."' The Court also characterized
such comment as "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege"'9 in that "[i]t cuts down on the privilege by
making its assertion costly.""0
The Supreme Court reinforced the Griffin decision when it held
in Carter v. Kentucky' that upon request by the defendant, the trial
judge must instruct the jury that it may not draw any adverse
inferences from the defendant's failure to testify. The Court had
previously held, in Lakeside v. Oregon,22 that such an instruction
could be given over the defendant's objection. Of course, a defendant
may waive the protection of the privilege by voluntarily testifying'
and the scope of the "waiver is determined by the scope of relevant
cross-examination.924

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id. at 615.
Wilson, 149 U.S. at 66.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
Id.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.

450 U.S. 288 (1981).
435 U.S. 333 (1978).
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951).
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958).
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More recently, in Mitchell v. United States,25 the Court extended
the no-adverse-inference rule to the sentencing stage of a criminal
prosecution. The trial judge had relied, in part, on the failure of the
defendant to testify, finding that she had been involved in the
distribution of greater than five kilograms of cocaine, which resulted
in a more severe sentence. However, the dissent in this case shows
that there is less than unanimous support for the no-adverseinference rule. Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Thomas, took aim at the rationale of the Griffin decision and
concluded that "the text and history of the Fifth Amendment give no
indication that there is a federal constitutional prohibition on the use
of the defendant's silence as demeanor evidence."26 Of the four
dissenters, only Thomas would actually reexamine Griffin and its
progeny, while the others would simply not have extended it to the
sentencing phase.
It should be noted that the above cited cases only dealt with the
right to remain silent at the trial itself. They did not involve any kind
of warning about the right to remain silent during interrogation or
the exercise of that right. The Miranda decision, however, held that
"it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.
The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood
mute or claimed his privilege in the face of an accusation."27 That
statement might only apply to the defendant who not only remains
silent at the interrogation, but who also remains silent at the trial.
Doyle v. Ohio' is the leading case on the adverse use of silence in the
face of Mirandawarnings against a testifying defendant.
In Doyle, the defendant chose to remain silent after being given
his Miranda warnings. When he testified for the first time at trial
with a somewhat exculpatory story, he was cross-examined about why
he had not come forth with that story when he was questioned by the
police. The Supreme Court held that such impeachment violated the
Constitution, but instead of relying on the Fifth Amendment privilege
and the Griffin line of cases, the Court instead relied on the Due
Process Clause in holding that it was simply "fundamentally unfair"
to "allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an

25. 526 U.S. 314 (1999).

26. Id. at 335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Miranda,384 U.S. 436, at 468 n.37.

28. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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explanation subsequently offered at trial."29 The court reasoned that
"while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings.""
An important question arises: why did the Court rely on Due
Process fairness rather than the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination? Certainly one answer is that in 1976, when Doyle
was decided, the Court had already started to distance the Miranda
decision from the Fifth Amendment. Michigan v. Tucker,3 decided in
1974, allowed the testimony of a prosecution witness whose identity
had been discovered during the questioning of the defendant where
the questioning violated Miranda. In reaching that decision, the
Court first started referring to the Miranda safeguards as "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution . .

"

The Court

continued this distinction between a Miranda violation and a
constitutional violation in such cases as Oregon v. Elstad" and New
York v. Quarles.34 Even though the Court has now recognized in
Dickerson v. United States" that Miranda was a constitutional
decision, it is not surprising that the Court in 1976 did not want to
further legitimize Miranda by basing the decision in Doyle on the
Fifth Amendment.
Another major reason for the due process basis in Doyle is the
division the Court had begun to carve out between the affirmative use
of the defendant's prior silence and the use of prior silence, or other
arguably inconsistent conduct or statements, for impeachment
purposes if the defendant elects to testify. Although Griffin and its
progeny were fairly strict in prohibiting the use of silence to adversely
affect a non-testifying defendant, the Court had previously recognized
less protection for the testifying defendant.
In Raffel v. United States,36 the defendant chose not to testify at
his first trial, but when he testified at a second trial, the Court
approved the use of his silence at the first trial for impeachment
purposes. Although subsequent cases have cast some doubt on the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 618.
Id.
417 U.S. 433 (1974).
Id. at 444.
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
271 U.S. 494, 495 (1926).
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continuing validity of Raffel,3 7 that case, along with Jenkins v.
Anderson3 8 and Fletcher v. Weir,39 clearly indicate the reduced concern

the Court feels for the use of silence for impeachment. Likewise, in
Harris v. New York"0 and Oregon v. Hass,4 the Court has approved of
the use of inconsistent pre-trial statements for impeachment, even
though obtained in violation of Miranda. In all of these cases the
Court has consistently pointed out the danger to the adversary system

if the credibility of a defendant's trial testimony cannot be tested by
the use of inconsistent pre-trial silence or statements." It is one thing
to prevent the use of silence when the defendant does not testify; it is
something else to allow the defendant to get away with lying on the

37. In Grunewald v. United States, the Court held that it was error to permit the
prosecutor, when cross-examining a defendant at trial, to use his assertion of his
Fifth Amendment privilege as a witness before a grand jury for impeachment.
Grunewald, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). "In effect, the Court limited Raffel to cases in which
the probative value of the cross-examination outweighed its possible impermissible
effect on the jury." Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, at 241, n.2 (1980) (Stevens, J.
concurring). Thus the Grunewald Court was "not faced with the necessity of deciding
whether Raffel has been stripped of vitality by the later Johnson case [Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943)] or of otherwise reexamining Raffel." Grunewald,
353 U.S. at 421.
38. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240-41 (approving the use of a defendant's pre-arrest, preMiranda warning silence for impeachment when the defendant chose to testify at
trial).
39. 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982) (per curiam) (approving the use of post-arrest but
pre-Miranda warning silence for impeachment purposes when the defendant chose to
testify at trial).
40. 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (approving of the use of statements made
immediately following the defendant's arrest for impeachment purposes when he
testified inconsistently at trial, despite the fact that the pre-trial statements were
preceded by defective Miranda warnings).
41. 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975). In Hass, after being advised of his Miranda rights, the
defendant asserted them by asking for a lawyer. The police refused to honor the
request and continued questioning Hass. The Court ruled that the statement then
obtained could be used for impeachment purposes when Hass testified at the trial.
See id.
42. For example, in Harris v. New York, the Court stated that "privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury ....Having voluntarily taken the
stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately .... "
Harris,401 U.S. at 225 (quoted favorably in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 237-38).
Raffel v. United States points out that when a defendant, who had not testified in his
first trial, "takes the stand in his own behalf, he does so as any other witness, and
within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined ...

U.S. at 496-97.

."

Raffel, 271
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witness stand in the face of arguably inconsistent pre-trial silence or
statements.
The final reason for the failure to rely on the Fifth Amendment in
Doyle is the Court's reluctance to find that any pre-trial silence is
actually "compelled" under the Fifth Amendment. The Court has said,
"[a]bsent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions."
Miranda, of course, created a presumption that custodial
interrogation was inherently coercive" unless there was compliance
with the safeguards contained therein. Despite this attempt to equate
"custodial interrogation" with the compulsion required for a violation
of the Fifth Amendment, the Court has consistently held, in such
cases as Michigan v. Tucker," New York v. Quarles," and Oregon v.
Elstad4 7 that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda has not
necessarily been compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Although the Court has now held in Dickerson v. United States" that
Miranda is a constitutional decision, nothing in that decision
necessarily changes the view that a statement, much less silence,
obtained in violation of Miranda is still not compelled for Fifth
Amendment purposes.49 In Jenkins v. Anderson, which approved of
the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a testifying defendant, the
Court held that "no governmental action induced petitioner to remain
silent before arrest."" Thus, it would appear that any pre-trial silence
on the part of a defendant will not be considered "compelled" by either
the police51 or the Fifth Amendment itself. It is only because the
Miranda warnings themselves implicitly assure a suspect that silence
"will carry no penalty"" that it is "fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be

43. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (emphasis added).
44. See 384 U.S. 436.
45. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
46. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
47. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
48. 30 U.S. 428 (2000).
49. See Albert W. Alschuler, Note, A PeculiarPrivilege in Historical Perspective:
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996), for an in-depth discussion
of the history of the right to remain silent and the privilege against selfincrimination.
50. 447 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).
51. It might, of course, be conceivable that silence could be "compelled" by a police
threat to beat the suspect if he says anything.
52. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
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used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial."" One
implication of Doyle, then, is that if the Miranda warnings were
altered to include a suggestion that silence might in fact carry a
penalty, as in England, perhaps it would no longer be unfair to
impose such a penalty.
IV. THE RIGHT TO SILENCE AND ADVERSE INFERENCES - ENGLAND
England has long recognized a common law privilege against selfincrimination and a related right to remain silent. "Broadly speaking,
the difference between them is that the privilege against selfincrimination deals with questions of direct compulsion of an accused
person to provide evidence against himself, whereas the right to
silence covers certain situations of indirect compulsion."54 The
common law privilege allows a person in any legal proceeding to
refuse to answer questions or produce documents which would tend to
incriminate him.55 The right to silence raises the issue of whether any
adverse evidentiary consequences may flow from a suspect's failure to
answer police questions during interrogation or to testify at his trial,
even though "[t]here is no directly enforceable duty to speak in these
situations."56
In addition to the common law origins of the privilege against
self-incrimination, it is also recognized in statute. The Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898 provides that "[a] person charged in criminal
proceedings shall not be called as a witness in the proceedings except
upon his own application," and
a person charged in criminal proceedings who is called as a witness
in the proceedings shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be
required to answer, any question tending to show that he has
committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence
other than the one with which he is then charged ....

53. Id.
54. I. H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 126 (2d ed. 2002).
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, c. 36, §§ 1-3 (Eng.). Section 2 provides that if an
accused chooses to testify he "may be asked any question in cross-examination
notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to any offence with which he

is charged in the proceedings." Section 3 also contains some exceptions to the
prohibition against asking questions on cross examination about crimes other than
those charged.
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In addition, the Civil Evidence Act of 1968 provides that "It]he
right of a person in any legal proceedings other than criminal
proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce any
document or thing if to do so would tend to expose that person to
proceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a penalty ....

",

The

privilege is said to include "both answers that would incriminate the
person directly and those which might incriminate indirectly, by
forming part of a line of inquiry leading to the obtaining of evidence
against the person." 9 This scope of the privilege is similar to the
United States, where the privilege applies to any "link in the chain of
evidence" needed to prosecute for a criminal offense.60
With respect to whether adverse inferences can be drawn from
the exercise of the privilege at trial, the common law position was
stated in Regina v. Bathurst:
[Tihe accepted form of comment is to inform the jury that, of
course, he is not bound to give evidence, that he can sit back and
see if the prosecution have proved their case, and that while the
jury have been deprived of the opportunity of hearing his story
tested in cross-examination, the one thing they must not do is to
assume that he is guilty because he has not gone into the witness
box.6
While that pronouncement makes it clear that an accused should
not be assumed guilty just because he did not testify, it also clearly
allows the judge to "make a thinly disguised attack on the defendant's
decision not to give evidence by pointing out the absence of scrutiny
that cross-examination affords." 2 That point was confirmed by the
Court of Appeal in R v. Martinez-Tobon, 3 in which the court said that
as long as the court does not contradict or nullify the essential
direction that the accused is not to be assumed guilty because he has
not given evidence, "the judge may think it appropriate to make a
stronger comment where the defence case involves alleged facts which
(a) are at variance with prosecution evidence or additional to it and

58. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, § 14(1) (Eng.).
59. DENNIS, supra note 54, at 131 (citing Slaney (1832) 5 C. & P. 213). See also
Lamb v. Munster, 10 Eng. Rep. 110 (Q.B.D. 1882).
60. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
61. 2 Q.B. 99, 107-08 (Eng. C.A. 1968).
62. MARTIN HANNIBAL &
EVIDENCE 113 (2002).

LISA MOUNTFORD,

63. See 98 Crim. App. R. 375 (1994).

THE

LAW

OF CRIMINAL

AND

CIVIL
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exculpatory, and (b) must, if true, be within the knowledge of the
defendant." '
Parliament has the authority to change the common and
statutory law, and it has done just that. Numerous statutes "require
individuals to answer questions, provide information and produce
documents in a variety of procedura[1] contexts, with a threat of
criminal sanctions for non-compliance."6'5 The Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act of 1994 (CJPOA) now provides that at the conclusion
of the evidence for the prosecution, if the accused "chooses not to give
evidence, or having been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer
any question, it will be permissible for the court or jury to draw such
inferences as appear proper from his failure to give evidence or his
refusal without good cause, to answer any question."66 Thus, after the
adoption of the CJPOA, the judge's comments about the failure of the
defendant to testify can be quite explicit and no longer have to be
"thinly veiled." The history and impact of the CJPOA will be
discussed below in relation to the drawing of adverse inferences from
the exercise of the right to silence during the interrogation process.
The English common law has long recognized a right to remain
silent in the face of police interrogation. For example, in Rex v.
Leckey,67 the defendant, who was being investigated in a murder, was
given the formal caution: "Do you wish to say anything in answer to
the charge? You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do
so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be
given in evidence."68 Leckey replied, "I have nothing to say until I
have seen someone, a solicitor."69 In summing up the case for the
jurors, the trial judge made several references to the fact that Leckey
had not denied the murder when given an opportunity to do so. At
one point he said,
If a man is charged with murder and is not responsible, if he has
not committed murder or anything like murder, what do you expect
64. Id.
65. DENNIS, supra note 54, at 132 (citing in particular the Theft Act of 1968, § 31;
the Criminal Damage Act of 1971, § 9; the Supreme Court Act of 1981, § 72; and the
Children Act of 1989, § 98).

66. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 35 (Eng.). That section
provides that it will not apply if "the accused's guilt is not at issue" or if "it appears to
the court that the physical or mental condition of the accused makes it undesirable

for him to give evidence." Id.
67. 1944 K.B. 80 (Eng. C.A.).

68. Id. at 81.
69. Id.

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
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him to say? Would you expect him to deny it .... Of course,
members of the jury, he is not bound to say anything, but what
would you expect?"
The judge further commented, "but can you understand how it
comes about, if he be innocent of the charge made against him, that
he never said: 'I did not murder the girl. When I left her she was
perfectly all right?' ,71 The Court of Criminal Appeal held that such
adverse comment on the defendant's silence was "misdirection" that
would justify quashing the conviction.
In another leading case on the issue, Hall v. R., 7" Lord Diplock
wrote:
It is a clear and widely known principle of the common law ... that
a person is entitled to refrain from answering a question put to him
for the purpose of discovering whether he has committed a criminal
offence .... It may be that in very exceptional circumstances an
inference may be drawn from a failure to give an explanation or a
disclaimer, but in their Lordship's view silence alone on being
informed by a police officer that someone else has made an
accusation against him cannot give rise to an inference that the
person to whom this information is communicated accepts the truth
of the accusation.73
Although this case affirmed a defendant's common law right to
silence, the language that "in very exceptional circumstances an
inference may be drawn from a failure to give an explanation"
suggests that the right to silence may be qualified. Subsequent cases,
like R v. Chandler,4 have used that language to suggest that silence
might be used against a defendant in a situation where the accused is
on "even terms" with his accuser."
Although the common law protection against any adverse
inference being drawn from the exercise of the right to silence during
questioning was well established, the above cases indicate that not all
jurists thought the right should be completely unfettered.
One
concern in particular that was raised was the ability of a defendant to
use the right to silence to assist in the presentation of an "ambush
defence." An ambush defence "arises where a defendant fails to put
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
[1970] 5 A.C. 108 (P.C. 1971).
Id. at 111-12.
63 Crim. App. R. 1 (1976).
See HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra note 62, at 112.
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forward his version of events at the police station but does so for the
first time at trial."76 Such a tactic obviously limits the amount of time
the prosecution has to investigate the facts surrounding the defense
and prepare a responsive strategy.
The first case to raise a concern about the "ambush defense" was
R v. Gilbert,77 in which the defendant raised a claim of self defense for
the first time at trial. Sympathetic to the unfairness of the ambush
defense, the court reaffirmed that the jury must be told that they
must not draw the inference of guilt from the defendant's silence,
while at the same time suggesting that "it may appear obvious to the
jury in the exercise of their common sense that an innocent man
would speak and not be silent"7" and that "it may not be a misdirection
to say simply 'this defence was first put forward at this trial.' "" In R
v. Alladice,8 ° the Lord Chief Justice wrote that there should be a right
of the court to comment on failure by the defendant to reveal a
defense which the defendant later springs on the prosecution."1
It was against this background of judicial concern about an
unqualified right to silence, particularly with respect to the ambush
defense, that the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was
established to investigate, among other things, whether the common
law right to silence should be modified.82 After hearing a broad range
of views for and against the modification of the right to silence, the
Royal Commission recommended in 1993 that the common law right
to silence be maintained in its then current form, with the addition of
a requirement that the defendant make some pre-trial disclosures.83
Parliament, however, disregarded the recommendation of the Royal
Commission and adopted the CJPOA, which allows the drawing of
adverse inferences from a suspect's silence in a number of different
situations. The CJPOA was modeled after certain provisions of the
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of 1988 which had been
in effect in Northern Ireland since 1988.84

Id. at 114. See also DENNIS, supra note 54, at 147.
See 66 Crim. App. R. 237 (1978).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.
87 Crim. App. R. 380 (1988).
Id. at 385-87.
82. HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra note 62, at 114.
83. Id. at 115.
84. DENNIS, supra note 54, at 147. See K.A. Cavanaugh, Emergency Rule, Normalcy
Exception: The Erosion of the Right to Silence in the United Kingdom, 35 CORNELL
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
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The most sweeping change with respect to the right to silence
during interrogation is contained in section 34, which provides:
(1) Where, in any proceeding against a person for an offence,
evidence is given that the accused(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on
being questioned under caution by a constable trying to
discover whether or by whom the offence had been committed,
failed to mention any fact relied on in his defence in those
proceedings; or
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that
he might be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact,
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time
the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention
when so questioned charged, or informed, as the case may be
85

The section then provides that "the court or jury, in determining
whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such
inferences from the failure as appear proper."86 Since this section now
effectively allows the court or jury to draw adverse inferences from
the fact of the accused's silence during interrogation, it became
necessary to amend the wording of the "caution" that is given to the
suspect during interrogation. PACE Code C now provides that the
following caution must be given: "You do not have to say anything.
But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned
something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may
be given in evidence.""7
While section 34 retains the accused's right to remain silent, at
least to the extent that the accused cannot be charged for a separate
offense or contempt for remaining silent,8 it is clear that the section
now imposes a burden on the exercise of that right. It is also clear
that section 34 does not operate to allow silence to only be used for
impeachment purposes should the defendant choose to testify.
L.J. 491 (2002) (discussing the background of the right to silence in Northern
Ireland).
85. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 34. (Eng.).
86. Id. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 also provides that such
adverse inferences can be drawn when the accused fails to testify at the trial (§ 35),
when he fails to account for any "object, substance, or mark" present during his arrest
(§ 36), or fails to account for his presence at a particular place (§ 37). Id. at § 35-37.
87. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
88. DENNIS, supra note 54, at 147.
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Rather, the section applies anytime a defendant has "relied" on a fact
that he "failed to mention" during interrogation. The Court of Appeal
has held that such reliance could occur simply by adducing a fact
during the cross-examination of a prosecution witness and is not
limited to facts raised during the defense's case-in-chief. 9
Perhaps the most significant impact of this section is on the
nature of the advice a legal advisor should give a suspect during
interrogation. Prior to the adoption of section 34, it would have been
fairly safe, as it is in the United States under Miranda," to advise a
client to remain silent. However, under section 34, such advice is
much more difficult to give, since the legal advisor now has to
"carefully weigh the risk of the suspect making inculpatory
statements ... against the drawing of adverse inferences at trial .... ."'

One English practitioner has referred to the "cat and mouse game"
that now exists between defense lawyers and the police as a result of
of
CJPOA.9 2
Another commentator has referred to the "sea
3
uncertainty" in which custodial legal advisors must now operate.9
One particular aspect of this legal advice dilemma has to do with
the effect, if any, legal advice to remain silent has on the operation of
section 34 and the ability of the court or juries to draw adverse
inferences. Under section 34, a judge should direct a jury that it may
draw adverse inferences from silence only if "the reason for the silence
was that the defendant had no story to give at the time of the
interview or no story that he was prepared to have questioned or
investigated."94 The Court of Appeal has held that "if it is a plausible
explanation that the reason for not mentioning facts is that the
[defendant] acted on the advice of his solicitor and not because he had
no, or no satisfactory, answer to give then no inference should be
89. R. v. Bowers, [1998] Crim. L.R. 817, cited in HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra
note 62, at 123.
90. Remaining silent would be particularly good advice in the United States, not
only because no adverse inferences can be drawn, but also because any statement
that is made can be used for impeachment should the defendant testify inconsistently
at trial. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
91. Raymond J. Toney, English CriminalProcedure Under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Implications For Custodial InterrogationPractices,24
Hous. J. INT'L. L. 411, 432 (2002).
92. Id. at 431 (citing Ed Cape, Advising on Silence: New Cases, New Strategies,
LEGAL ACTION, June 1999, at 14).

93. Id. (citing John Baldwin, Police Interrogation:What are the Rules of the Game?,
in SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

(David Morgan & Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds., 1994)).
94. DENNIS, supra note 54, at 150.

66, 72
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drawn."" Recognizing that "directions pursuant to section 34 of the
Act are never easy for a trial judge, particularly where reliance is
placed on legal advice,"96 the Court proceeded to provide a model
direction which concluded with:
If, on the other hand, you are satisfied that the true explanation for
either defendant's failure is that he did not at that time have any
answer to the allegations that were being put to him, or that he
realised that such explanation as he had would not at that stage
stand up to questioning or investigation by the police and that the
advice of the solicitor did no more than to provide him with a
convenient shield behind which to hide, then and only then can you

draw such inferences as you consider proper from his failure.97
Thus, it is possible for a defendant to avoid having the jury told
that it can draw adverse inferences from silence if that silence is
based on advice from counsel. One obvious problem with this
approach, of course, is that the jury will still be aware that the
defendant remained silent during interrogation and might very well
be inclined to draw an adverse inference even though the direction
from the court is otherwise. A less obvious, but perhaps more
troubling problem, is that a defendant will have to waive his attorney
client privilege in order to convince a jury that legal advice was the
valid reason for remaining silent during interrogation. In order to
raise the issue of the reason for the silence, it will generally be
necessary for the defendant to testify about the advice received from
his lawyer during interrogation. The Court of Appeal has held that
although disclosure of the fact that the defendant received legal
advice does not constitute a waiver of the privilege, any disclosure of
the reasons for the advice to remain silent will result in a waiver.9 It
used to be quite common for legal advisors to give their reasons for
advising silence at the beginning of a tape-recorded interview.99
However, the Court of Appeal has held that such disclosure of the
reasons for the advice, but not just the fact of the advice itself,
resulted in a waiver of the privilege and allowed the prosecutor to
cross-examine the defendant about his conversations with his

95. R. v. Betts, 2 Crim. App. R. 16,
53 (Eng. C.A. 2001).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
98. R. v. Bowden, 2 Crim. App. R. 176, 176-77 (1999).
99. HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra note 62, at 134.
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attorney.100

Because of these rulings, English attorneys are now

advised that in order to avoid a waiver of the privilege they should
simply state the fact of the advice to remain silent and not any
reasons that could be based on any privileged conversations with their
client.'1

Although, as suggested earlier,"2 Parliament is not bound by a
constitution in the enactment of legislation, it is bound to some extent
by the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, commonly referred to as the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which the United
Kingdom ratified on March 8, 1951.103 The primary provision of the

ECHR that applies to criminal prosecutions is Article 6, which
Previously, an
essentially guarantees the right to a fair trial.'
English defendant who complained that his right to a fair trial under
Article 6 of the ECHR had been violated could not obtain a remedy
directly in the English courts. Instead, the person would have had to
apply to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg for a
ruling that England, as a member state of the ECHR, had violated his
Convention rights."5 Such a ruling by the Strasbourg Court, however,
did not change any English law or provide the aggrieved person any
directly enforceable right." 6 In part because of England's poor record
of voluntary compliance with the rulings of the European Court,
Parliament passed the Human Rights Act of 1998, which essentially
incorporates into English law the provisions of the ECHR. °7 Under
the Human Rights Act, courts are under a duty not to act in a way
that is incompatible with a Convention right and must interpret
English law in a way that is compatible with the Convention." 8 With
respect to case law, the English courts must disregard any precedent
that is incompatible with the jurisprudence of the Convention.
However, with respect to legislation, if it is not possible to interpret it
in a way that is compatible with the Convention, the court may not
Rather, the court may make a
declare the legislation void.
100. HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra note 62, at 134 (citing R. v. Fitzgerald [1998] 4

Archbold News 2 and R. v. Bowden, 2 Crim. App. R. 176 (1999)).
101. HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra note 62, at 134.
102. See infra Part II.
103. Toney, supra note 91, at 413 n.3.
104. Id. at 415 n.9.
105. DENNIS, supra note 54, at 35.
106. See id.
107. See id.

108. See id. at 35-36.
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declaration of incompatibility with the Convention, with the
expectation that Parliament will amend the legislation to bring it into
compliance with the Convention.
The final issue to be discussed is whether the provisions of the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, that allow adverse
inferences to be drawn from the exercise of the right to silence,
constitute a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
as applied to England through the Human Rights Act of 1998.
Although the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
silence are not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention,
the European Court of Human Rights has held that "the right to
remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against selfincrimination are generally recognised international standards which
11°
lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6."
The Court went on to hold, however, that these rights are not absolute
and that "it is equally obvious that these immunities cannot and
should not prevent that the accused's silence, in situations which
clearly call for an explanation from him, be taken into account in
assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution."'11 One commentator has suggested that an adverse
inference based on silence may be drawn in compliance with Article 6
if four conditions are met:
(1) The accused must have been afforded access to legal advice before
being interviewed ....
(2) The jury must have been properly directed to consider the
accused's reason for silence ....
(3) An adverse inference from silence must not be the sole or main
evidence for conviction ....
(4) The facts -- as established by the other evidence -- must clearly

call for an explanation from the accused, an explanation to be taken
into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution ... 112

109. See id. at 36.
110. HANNIBAL & MOUNTFORD, supra note 62, at 137 (citing Murray v. United
Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1996)).

111. Id.
112. Ian Dennis, Silence in the Police Station: The Marginalisationof Section 34,
CRIM. L. REV.25, 28-29 (Jan. 2002).

MIRANDA

20031

If these conditions are met, "we can now be reasonably confident
that an English court will not be persuaded to make a declaration
under section 4 of the HRA that section 34 is incompatible with Art.
6."113
Even though it appears that the application of section 34 is, thus,
not a violation of Article 6, it has still not been enthusiastically
received by the English judiciary. In one of the first cases to interpret
section 34, Lord Bingham ended his discussion of the section with the
"disparaging comment" 4 that "Parliament in its wisdom has seen fit
to enact this section.""' In the subsequent case of R. v. Bowden,"'
Lord Bingham wrote: "Proper effect must of course be given to these
provisions. But since they restrict rights recognised at common law
as appropriate to protect defendants against the risk of injustice, they
should not be construed more widely than the statutory language
requires."1' At least one commentator has suggested that judges in
subsequent cases have shown a willingness to follow this grudging
application of section 34, turning it into an "extraordinarily technical
rule of corroboration.""' As a result, "section 34 has been increasingly
marginalized."' 19 Repeal of section 34, although "politically unlikely,"
would "certainly simplify the law and make the lot of trial judges an
easier one. '
V.

CONCLUSION

Both the United States and England have had a similar tradition
of protecting the right to silence during the interrogation process.
England, however, has chosen to depart from that tradition and
lessen that protection by allowing adverse inferences to be drawn,
under certain circumstances, from the exercise of that right. The
United States has thus far stood firmly committed against the
drawing of adverse inferences, at least in the face of Miranda
warnings. That stance, however, is not based on any commitment to
values underlying the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to silence, but rather simply on the notion that it is unfair to use
113. Id. at 27.
114. Id. at 29 (quoting R. v. Argent, 2 Crim. App. R. 32 (1997)).
115. R. v. Argent, 2 Crim. App. R. 32 (1997).
116. See generally 2 Crim. App. R. 176 (1999).
117. Id. at 181.
118. Dennis, supra note 112, at 38.
119. Id. at 37.
120. Id. at 38.
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a suspect's silence against him after having just told him he had a
right to remain silent. England, however, has altered that notion of
unfairness by the simple addition of another warning that silence
might in fact be harmful.

